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Abstract 
Korea´s development in the last four decades of the 20th century was astonishing. The growth 
rate of GDP per capita was even the highest in the world during the period 1965 to 1990. 
After the World War II, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, however, it 
gradually transformed into an advanced economy. In the late 1990s, Korea was heavily 
affected by the Asian financial crisis. The crisis revealed longstanding weaknesses in Korea's 
development model. After this crisis, Korea managed to implement broad structural reforms. 
The country started to build a knowledge economy and we can claim that it has been 
successful. Nowadays, we often hear that a crisis represents an opportunity. Korea is an 
example of a country that was truly able to utilize such an opportunity. Therefore, the Korean 
transition to the knowledge economy that was initiated after the financial crisis 1997 – 1998 
could be an inspiration for Central European countries. 
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In the 21st century, Korea has become one of the most important world economies; No. 
13 as far as the economic power is concerned. The development in the last four decades of the 
20th century was astonishing. The growth rate of GDP per capita was even the highest in the 
world during the period 1965 to 1990. After the World War II, Korea was one of the poorest 
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countries in the world, however, it gradually transformed into an advanced knowledge 
economy. Nowadays, Korea is an important technological hub where leading world 
technological companies such as Samsung or LG operate. After Sweden, United States and 
Finland, Korea has fourth highest investments in knowledge as a percentage of GDP (almost 
6 percent). In 2004, Korea was the world No. 1 in terms of the proportion of broadband 
internet subscribers with a distinct advantage over other highly developed countries.   
The Czech Republic and Korea have a lot of common features. Surveying the 
economic rankings, we can find that both countries are neighbours in the fourth ten with 
almost the same GDP per capita. Both countries became democracies in the late 1980s after a 
long period of totalitarian regime and then proceeded to do fundamental economic reforms. 
Therefore, both countries have still been rated among transition countries, emerging market 
and similar. After 2000, we can observe increasing mutual relationships (investment, trade). 
In spite of it, our acquaintance with the Korean economic development and prospects has 
remained modest. 
The aim of the paper is to characterize in more detail the Korean economic situation 
after two financial crises, which affected the Korean economy during the last 12 years. It is 
also interesting to compare reactions of the Korean and Czech government to these events.  
The introductory part of the paper defines theoretical terms used in subsequent text. 
After a brief overview of the successful post-war era, the paper focuses on the causes, course 
and consequences of the Korean financial crisis in 1997 – 1998. The final part outlines the 
current economic situation in Korea and states some implications from the evolution of the 
last two decades. 
 
2. Key Theoretical Terms: the Asymmetric Information Analysis of the 
Financial Crises and the Knowledge Economy 
F. Mishkin (1997) characterizes a financial crisis to be a nonlinear disruption of 
financial markets when the asymmetric information result in moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems; as a consequence of them, financial markets are no longer able to 
efficiently channel funds to those who need them to engage in productive investment 
opportunities.  
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The periods of uncertainty at the financial market can make adverse selection and 
moral hazard worse. The credits become inaccessible even for many companies that dispose 
of perspective investment projects because at the time of market fluctuations it is difficult to 
separate good and bad opportunities. And the shortage of credits forces companies to reduce 
their spending, which causes a decline of economic activity.  
J. Hahm and F. Mishkin (2000) state four factors that can lead to worsening of 
asymmetric information problems and thus to financial instability: 
• deterioration in financial sector balance sheets 
• increases in interest rates 
• increases in uncertainty 
• deterioration of nonfinancial balance sheets 
Hahm and Mishkin also distinguish two stages of financial crises. The first stage (“The 
Runup to the Currency Crisis”) is typically a financial liberalization resulting in a dramatic 
rise of lending that is supported by the inflow of foreign capital. Excessive risk-taking is the 
consequence brought about primarily by the weak financial regulation that is characteristic of 
emerging market countries.  
Subsequently, an unsafe dynamics emerges. Domestic banks offer high returns in 
order to attract international funds to increase their lending. They are highly successful 
because foreign investors consider the investments that local government protect. A 
subsequent credit boom leads to excessive risk-taking of some banks and it leads to serious 
loan losses and deterioration in financial sector balance sheets. Consecutively, banks respond 
with restrictions in their credit policy. The resulting credit crunch can significantly harm the 
condition of economy. 
The deterioration in financial sector balance sheets is a crucial factor causing the 
second stage – a currency crisis. Domestic banking sector becomes weaker and for the central 
bank, it is more and more difficult to protect the currency against speculative attacks. The 
central bank can´t sufficiently increase interest rates because there is a danger that the banking 
system may break down. When investors reveal the powerlessness of central authorities, they 
are even more stimulated to carry out a speculative attack.  
The collapse of the currency results in increases in indebtedness of the firms that have 
debts denominated in foreign currencies (this is frequent in emerging-market countries) and 
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can lead to higher inflation. Increased interest rates further aggravate household and firm 
balance sheets. Consecutively, some of them are no longer able to pay off their repayments, 
resulting in further significant losses for the banks.  
Both acts: banking and currency crises reduce the possibilities of the banks to lend and 
also make adverse selection and moral hazard problem more serious. Hahm and Mishkin 
claim that financial crises cause deterioration in financial and nonfinancial firm balance sheet; 
the result is a sharp restriction on lending and a severe economic fall. 
The World Bank (Korea as a Knowledge Economy, 2006) defines a “knowledge 
economy” as an economy when the sustained use and creation of knowledge are at the centre 
of its economic development process. The prosperous transition to a knowledge economy 
involves elements such as making long-term investments in education, developing 
innovations capability, modernizing the information infrastructure and having an economic 
environment that is conducive to market transactions. The result will be higher-value-added 
products, which increases the probability of prosperity in the current highly competitive and 
globalized world economy.  
 
3. Overview of the Korean Rapid Development after 1960 
The overview is based on following papers: Korea's Economy (2000) and Lee (2008). 
Information and data concerning the development of human capital and technological 
progress were obtained from Korea as a Knowledge Economy (2006). 
Korean economic growth after 1945 can be divided into five stages: the period of 
reconstruction (1945 – 1961), the export oriented growth period (1962 – 1972), the crisis and 
recovery period (1973 – 1981), the adjustment and growth period (1982 – 1996) and the 
period between two financial crises (1998 – 2008). 
However, the admirable way to industrialization and rapid growth of the living 
standard began in the early 1960s with the introduction of the First Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan. The government policy shifted from import substitution to export 
orientation. The substance of the pro-export policy was to promote export of labour-intensive 
light industry products (textiles, bicycles) because these branches were competitive due to 
cheap labour costs. The government uses steps such as maintaining high interest rates to 
support savings or enacting the Foreign Promotion Act to stimulate foreign investors to come. 
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Exporters were encouraged with direct export subsidies, tax exemption or export loans with 
lower interest rate. We can mention devaluation of the Korean Won by almost 100 percent in 
1964, which was an extraordinary incentive for Korean export. 
Although many domestic conservative economists disagreed with this strategy, the 
results came soon and were impressive. The average growth rate at this period reached 8.7 
percent. The real value of Korean exports increased by 30 percent per year and the share of 
export in GNP grew from 6 percent to 30 percent in 1973. Another important feature of the 
Korean upturn at this period was a dramatic structural change: the share of agricultural sector 
decreased from 37 to 25 percent, the share of the mining and manufacturing grew from 16 to 
26 percent. The Korean government managed to solve the problem of post-war inflation; the 
inflation rate dropped under 10 percent and after 1965 stayed in single-digits.  
We can say that the 1960s was the crucial period of the Korean way into the category 
of developed countries. Nevertheless, after this successful stage, Korea got into difficulties in 
the early 1970s. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and subsequent fluctuation in 
exchange rates had a devastating impact on the Korean balance of payment. The economic 
situation was further aggravated as a consequence of commodity shortage and the oil shock 
during 1972 – 1974. The inflation rate jumped to 20 percent in 1974, Korea had a persistent 
deficit in current account and foreign debt rose very quickly. 
The Korean government reacted to adverse international conditions with the Third 
Five-Year Plan (1972 – 1976). This new strategy redirected the economy to the heavy and 
chemical industry. The technologically sophisticated industries were strongly supported. As a 
consequence, extensive investment programs were introduced to encourage branches such as 
shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals and electronics as well. The results of this strategy are 
disputable: on the one hand new perspective products were developed, on the other hand, 
excessive corporate debts and nonperforming loans were accumulated. 
In spite of some positive aspects and a recovery in the second half, the 1970s aren´t 
valued as a particularly successful stage. Moreover, this period was ended with the 
unfavourable year 1980, when the Korean economy declined by 2.7 percent. The worst GDP 
result since 1957 was caused by external (the second oil shock) and internal (murder of 
President Park in October 1979) factors.  
After the critical year 1980, Korea reached fast recovery and stabilization of the price 
level. The GDP growth rate was 6.2 percent a year later and 12 percent in 1983. The highly 
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valued economic adjustment was connected with a shift in policies from the strategy of direct 
intervention to indirect guidance. So the 1980s can be labelled as the period of liberalization. 
Within the liberalization program commercial banks were privatized, entry barriers into the 
financial sector were lowered, restrictions on foreign direct investments were loosened etc. 
Simultaneously, the system of higher education expanded thanks to investments in Korean 
research and development through the establishment of the National Research and 
Development Program.  
The economic liberalization and deregulation was accompanied by a relaxation of the 
political regime. The gradual democratization process culminated in 1987 when the new 
constitution was adopted and free elections were held. The democratic Korea experienced an 
exceptional economic prosperity. During the period 1986 – 1992, the average growth rate was 
9.2 percent, the average rate of inflation remained under 6 percent and the unemployment rate 
sank to the level of 2.5 percent in 1988. In spite of some troubles in the early 1990s (a slightly 
higher inflation, repeated deficit of current account), the Korean economy continued in its 
rapid development. The growth reached almost 9% rate in 1994 and 1995, the inflation rate 
stayed at a 4% level and the unemployment rate amounted to unprecedented 2 percent. Korea 
also went on to pursue high-value-added manufacturing by promoting high-technology 
innovation. The completion of the Korean journey into the society of advanced economy was 
confirmed with the accession to the OECD in 1996.  
 
4. Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis 1997 – 1998 
From one point of view, in the 1990s Korea had an advanced competitive market 
economy with a four-decade-long tradition of rapid sustainable growth.  
At the beginning of the crisis, the macroeconomic data indicated that the Korean 
economy was found in a rather good condition. In 1996 and 1997, the public finance was 
almost in balance. The current account deficit was improved to less than 2 percent of GDP. 
The rate of inflation remained below 5 percent, the 6% growth rate was expected, the rate of 
savings exceeded 30 percent etc. From this – macroeconomic – point of view, Korea seemed 
to be a well-managed economy and for that reason, the financial crisis in Korea was such a 
big surprise to the markets (Hahm and Mishkin, 2000). 
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From another point of view, there were hidden quite a lot of potentially problematic 
issues in the Korean economy. These seamy sides were revealed during the financial crisis 
that hit Korean economy in 1997 and 1998.  
This point of view could be found for example in the World Bank report Korea as 
knowledge economy (2006). The text points out limitations of the Korean model in the era of 
globalization and dynamic technological changes. The Korean mechanism of resource 
allocation with the strong and discretionary power of the government had been effective when 
the economy started its rapid development. However, when the economy became larger and 
more complex, it neared its limits. The crisis demonstrated the limitations of discretionary 
resource allocation and highlighted the necessity for comprehensive reforms. The old 
institutions and policies that had been so convenient in the early high-growth period turned 
out to be bottlenecks for a successful development in the new economic environment.  
Naturally, it is also possible to find some external factors that had an impact on 
Korean difficulties during the crisis. Japan, Korea´s most important export market, fell into a 
recession in 1996 and the Japanese yen depreciated strongly against dollar (and therefore 
against won). It was one of the reasons for a worsening of the Korean export in 1996 (Noland, 
2005). And obviously, there was a momentous influence of a crisis developing in other 
countries in the region. Nevertheless, the most important causes originated in the Korean 
economy. 
During the 1990s, the Korean economy became vulnerable to adverse shocks. Main 
sources of the increased vulnerability were an excessively short-term oriented external debt 
structure combined with inadequate foreign exchange reserves and a highly leveraged 
corporate financial structure (Korea´s economy, 2000). The official data presented by 
Ministry of Finance show the problem of Korea´s external liabilities. 
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Table 1 External Liabilities 
 
M. Noland (2005) points out an investment boom between 1994 and 1996 that was 
increasingly financed by foreign borrowing as a result of the financial liberalization in the 
1990s. A significant share was invested in industries with excess capacity and in the mid 
1990s, Korea recorded a decelerating total factor productivity growth, a deterioration of trade 
and decreasing profitability. 
Hahm and Mishkin (2000) offer an elaborate survey of causes of the Korean financial 
crisis using the above mentioned asymmetric information analysis. According to their 
approach, the deterioration in financial sector balance sheets is probably a significant factor 
causing financial crises. The Table 2 shows three officially published indicators of balance 
sheets. The official data demonstrate a moderate deterioration in bank balance sheets before 
the crisis. They got worse rapidly as late as in 1997: below the minimum 8% BIS and 4% 
capital to asset ratio. However, the Table 3 presents more realistic author’s calculations that 
include latent non-performing loans. These calculations indicate that the total bank asset ratio 
was at a lower level than according to official statistics. 
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Table 2 Indicators of Bank Balance Sheets & Asset Quality 
 
Table 3 The Adjusted Indicator by Hahm and Mishkin (2000) 
 
Similarly, both the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of domestic 
commercial banks decreased during 1994 – 1997. It also implies that the profitability of the 
banking sector had a declining tendency at the beginning of the crisis.  
It is interesting that unlike the forecasters, the stock market managed to become aware 
of the long-lasting latent bad loan problems in the balance sheet. The aggregate index and 
index for banking industry was developing in a very similar way until 1993 but from 1994, 
the bank stock price index started to fall behind very significantly. 
As we mentioned above, the highly leveraged corporate financial structure was 
another important source of structural vulnerability. Hahm and Mishkin analyse this problem 
elaborately as well. We can summarize that similarly as in the banking sector, the debt and 
profitability indicators worsened during the 1990s and especially in 1996, there was a sharp 
decline in corporate profitability. 
 
5. The Course of the Korean Financial and Economic Crisis 1997 - 1998 
Some indications of impending difficulties could be seen in 1996, the market stock 
experienced its peak even in 1994. However, a real turn in economic conditions came with the 
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fall of Hanbo Steel due to its debts in January 1997. The fourteenth largest chaebol was the 
first one that went bankrupt in more than a decade. In addition, this collapse was soon 
followed by the failures of two more chaebol. It was obvious that the long-lasting era of too-
big-to-fail policy was just about to end. Consequently, the interest rates in the large corporate 
bond market went up and a similar process occurred in the government market. It is possible 
to say that the markets were signalling an increase in Korean country risk (Noland, 2005). 
With the vulnerability of the Korean financial system and the situation in other 
countries in East Asia, Korea started to be threatened by speculative attacks against the 
domestic currency. The attacks became more serious with the collapse of Asian market stocks 
and downgrading Korea´s rating. From October until the end of the year won depreciated by 
47 percent. With the sharp depreciation of won and with an effort to solve this problem, the 
market interest rate rose to over 20 percent (Hahm and Mishkin, 2000). This process had a 
serious negative impact on the economic activity but especially on investment. During the 
crisis, sales fell by 20 percent while investment fell by nearly 100 percent. (Gilchrist and Sim, 
2007). 
Korean authorities spent billions of dollars in their effort to defend the currency. 
However, the foreign reserves of Korea were almost depleted within a few weeks and on 
November 21, 1997, the government announced that it would seek emergency loan from the 
International Monetary Fund. (Korea´s economy, 2000). 
The IMF and other donors provided a $57 billion package, the largest in history, 
nevertheless, in return for broad reforms. The agreement was promptly criticised by both 
Korean politicians and economists: The former refused the interference in internal affairs; the 
latter were sceptical about eventual implementation of the reforms. In the meantime, the 
prices of Korean assets fell down. On December 18, Kim Dae-jung was elected the new 
president who resumed negotiations with the Fund, which led to the second rescue package. 
On the other hand, the IMF extracted important policy commitments including a restrictive 
fiscal and monetary policy and a broad spectrum of structural reforms. (Noland, 2005). 
 
6. The Korean Reforms after the Crisis 
Nowadays, we can hear quite often: the crisis is an opportunity. As regards the Korean 
financial crisis 1997 – 1998, this claim is valid because Korea managed to realize real long-
term causes and above all, Korea approached deep reforms indeed. Generally, we can divide 
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the Korean reforms into two directions: direct measures in the financial sector and broader 
structural reforms. 
Based on their asymmetric analysis that provides an explanation of the Korean 
financial crisis, Hahm and Mishkin (2000) speak about implying lessons for policymakers. 
The lessons are particularly pertinent in the area of prudential supervision. Promoting strong 
prudential supervision to prevent excessive risk taking which can lead to deterioration in 
financial sector balance sheets is crucial for preventing financial instability. The authors state 
eight principles for establishment of a strong regulatory system. 
• Adequate resources and statutory authority – without the resources, the bank 
supervisory agency will not be able to monitor sufficiently the risky activities of 
banks. 
• Prompt corrective action – a regulatory forbearance that lets overextended companies 
in operation sharply increases moral hazard incentives to engage in risky activities. 
Therefore, a fast action to stop these activities and possibly to close down insolvent 
institutions is a key measure. 
• Focus on risk management – because of a rapid development of financial innovations, 
the traditional approach to bank supervision that focuses on the quality of the bank´s 
balance sheet has been no longer adequate.  
• Independence of the bank regulatory agency – the independence from the political 
process is an important precondition for resolute actions.  
• Accountability of bank supervisors – the regulator does not have the same motivation 
as the taxpayer (who provides money into the system of regulation). The potential 
principal-agent problem can be solved if bank supervisors are made accountable and 
have sufficient incentives to do their job properly. 
• Use of market-based discipline – two additional measures can help increase market 
discipline: to require that banks have credit ratings and issue subordinated debt.  
• Limiting too-big-to-fail – this policy significantly increases the moral hazard problem. 
A possible partial solution of this problem is to announce that when there is a bank 
failure, uninsured creditors will not be fully protected. Another possibility is to work 
with the presumption that in serious problems, companies will not be treated as too-
big-to-fail. 
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• Entry of foreign banks – it presents a chance to strengthen the banking system. 
Foreign banks have more diversified portfolios and use funds from all over the world. 
Therefore, they are exposed to fewer risks and are less vulnerable to negative shocks 
from the domestic economy. 
We can claim that many of these recommendations were implemented. The Non-
Performing Asset Resolution Fund was set in November 1997. Its aim was to clear bad loans 
from the accounts of financial institutions. In April 1998, an independent authority, the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), was established to integrate supervisory and 
regulatory mechanism over banking, securities and insurance sector. The FSC and its part, the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), were equipped with statutory authorities including the 
power to instruct mergers, write-offs and closures of problematic financial companies. 
Korea also respected a recommendation of corrective action (although not 
immediately). In June 1998, two important banks, the Korea First Bank and the Seoul Bank, 
were recapitalized by the government and then sold off to foreign investors. Five insolvent 
banks were closed down and other six were merged into three large banks. Sixteen merchant 
banks were shut down and the remaining fourteen had to carry out clearing of bad loans 
through an increase in equity capital. The licenses of a few security companies, insurance 
companies and investment trust companies were revoked. The bankruptcies of large banks 
and chaebol disturbed rooted expectations of too-big-to-fail policy. From August 1998, a 
guaranty of deposits was limited as well. 
On the contrary, the supervision of risk management in Korean banks and the 
accountability of supervisors have remained the problematic issues from the list of policy 
lessons. 
Apart from the area of the prudential supervision in the financial sector, there were 
many reforms in other part of Korean economics. The corporate sector reforms were also 
relatively closely connected with the financial crisis. They had two main aims: to reduce the 
oversized corporate debt and to establish a more transparent management. Unlike in the past, 
the government focused especially on improving the legal and institutional environment and 
ended with favouring of large companies. And it was important that chaebol agreed with the 
process of their restructuring. To be specific, we can mention that the FSC set new accounting 
and auditing rules according to the international standards; legal protections for minority 
shareholders were strengthened etc. (Korea´s economy, 2000). 
315 
Other sets of reforms were related to the liberalization of the Korean rigid labour 
market and the inefficient public sector. However, we draw our attention to the development 
of a knowledge economy. The Word Bank´s study “Korea as a Knowledge economy” (2006) 
states that in 1998, Korea officially started a campaign to make a transition to an advanced 
knowledge-based economy in which domestic innovations can be a main source of sustaining 
economic growth. In this sense, the economic reforms since 1997 had three main objectives: 
• To transform Korea into a market-oriented economy by deregulating across the sectors 
and thereby supporting competition, accompanied by a modern regulatory framework, 
• To better the institutional system by improving the rule of law and by having higher 
transparency in Korean economy, 
• To continue the transition to the knowledge-based economy by developing a modern 
legal and institutional infrastructure in areas such as intellectual property rights or 
valuation of incorporeal assets. 
The emphasis on the development of knowledge economy can be seen from the total 
expenditure on education. Its share of GDP reached 7.1 percent in 2002, a much higher level 
than the OECD average of 5.8 percent. Korea only fell behind Iceland, United States and 
Denmark in this regard. As was mentioned in the introduction, Korea has an analogous 
position in terms of investment in knowledge. Similarly, Korea is a world leader in using 
internet and computer technology. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The current uncertainty in the world economy presents a challenge for the Korean 
economy. However, compared with the financial crisis 1997 – 1998, the Korean economy 
faces the challenges from a better position: both the financial and corporate sector is in a 
relatively good condition and foreign exchange reserves are high (Lall and Eskesen, 2009). 
We can say that the Korean economy is much less vulnerable to foreign exchange risk than in 
the 1990s. Despite the uncertainty about the recovery of world economy, we can expect that 
Korea will be among the first countries that will restore the economic growth when global 
trends turn.  
And the latest data validate these statements convincingly: the Bank of Korea 
announced that the GDP grew by 2.9 percent in the third quarter compared with the previous 
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quarter when it expanded by 2.6 percent. It has been the strongest growth since an expansion 
of 3.8 percent in the first quarter of 2002. Concurrently, the unemployment rate fell in 
September to a level of 3.4 percent. These results are unrivalled among the OECD countries.  
It is obvious that the present Korea´s position has been a consequence of broad 
structural reforms that were implemented after the previous financial crisis. These reforms 
strengthened Korea´s flexibility and resilience that are so important for a highly open 
economy in the era of globalization. Nowadays, we often hear that a crisis represents an 
opportunity. Korea is an example of a country that was truly able to utilize such an 
opportunity. A crucial fact is that Korea did not limit itself only to reforms of the affected 
financial sector. On the contrary, the country started to build a knowledge economy and we 
can claim that it has been successful. 
When we compare this with the current situation in the Czech Republic, we can see an 
essential difference. The Czech Republic has been successfully solving immediate 
consequences of the crisis. However, the mid-term perspective is not very optimistic. Only a 
mild recovery in 2010 and 2011 is expected and more and more voices warn that the Czech 
Republic and possibly the whole region has to forget the rates of growth of about 5 percent. 
The procrastination with the reforms is a fundamental argument to these opinions. Therefore, 
the Korean transition to the knowledge economy that was initiated after the financial crisis 
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